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INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Clinton Administration announced plans to develop
the National Information Infrastructure ("Nil"), a technological
measure that would expand public access to information.1 This
proposed "information highway" has given rise to questions regarding
how traditional legal and commercial principles should be adapted to
regulate emerging electronic information commerce.2 The govern-
ment has not yet established what constitutes a traffic violation on this
1. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLEGTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 8-9 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. Working Group
reports and documents of the Information Infrastructure Task Force are available via the
Internet at <http://www.iitf.nisLgov>. See id. at n.11.
2. This Comment adopts the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B Drafting Committee's
proposed definition of an electronic transaction: "a transaction in which one party ...
contemplates that an agreement may be formed through the use of electronic messages or
responses .... " U.C.C. § 2B-102 (14) (draft May 3, 1996). SeeAngela Littwin, Internet Analysts
Take a Hard Look at the Feasibiliy of Electronic Commerce, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 1997, at 68
(citing unresolved concerns with conducting business over Internet such as preserving consumer
privacy, ensuring proper authentication of on-line vendors, providing security from theft, and
developing effective payment systems).
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cyber-thoroughfare, but we may anticipate portions of a future code
of conduct by examining the current state of information commerce
and how it is regulated.'
The information industry presently constitutes over two percent of
the gross national product of the United States4 and promises
continued growth as information technology continues to develop.5
If digital information commerce is to thrive, however, the law must
protect the integrity of contracts and contracting methods used on
the information superhighway. In particular, restricting the right of
purchasers to disclose commercially valuable information is one of the
most important needs of information merchants.7 Several courts,
aware that the ability to secure sensitive information from electronic
dissemination may serve the general public as well as commercial
providers,' have addressed this concern by enforcing contracts that
limit the uses to which a buyer may employ information obtained
commercially.' One court summarized the consequences of inade-
quate legal protections for commercially valuable information:
3. In particular, this Comment will examine recent trends in the law's treatment of
software licenses and the protection afforded works of information such as factual compilations.
4. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 281, 292-93 (1993) (indicating that in
1990 software industry alone accounted for more than two percent of gross national product and
information services had revenues in excess of $93 billion).
5. SeeRaymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts ofHubs, Spokes, and Reinvigorating
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L REv. 1337, 1369 (1994) (observing that virtually every company uses
one or more software products and that technology contracts underlie most modern sectors of
economy).
6. See David R. Johnson & Kevin A. Marks, Mapping Electronic Data Communications onto
Existing Legal Metaphors: Should We Let Our Conscience (and Our Contracts) Be Our Guide?, 38 VILL
L. REv. 487,490-91 (1993) (discussing necessity of rules and obligations in law of electronic data
communications); see also Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1370-71 (describing rise of information
industry in today's economy and subsequent need for contract rules that are accessible to legal
experts and laypersons).
7. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New
Imperatives ofCommercialLaw, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103,123 (1992) (explaining that right
to restrict disclosure and use is imperative to commercial sellers of electronic information who
seek to maintain property rights after sale); see also CRAIG JOYCE ET AL, COPYIGHT LAW
§ 1.05[C] [2], at 19-20 (3d ed. 1995) ("A company spending millions to develop a computer
operating system program or motion picture will have the greatest difficulty competing with an
imitator which has no development costs, can copy the program quickly and cheaply, and enters
the market immediately thereafter.").
8. See Elizabeth Corcoran & John Schwartz, On-Line Databases Draw Privacy Protests:
Unfounded L i.-Nexis Report Reflects Wony About Growing Files, WASH. PosT, SepL 20, 1996, at Al
(describing consumer panic following reports that Lexis-Nexis placed social security numbers
in database and had offered them for sale).
9. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 557 (4th Cir.
1990) (enforcing"Non-circumvention and Nondisclosure Agreement" by granting injunction to
prevent improper and unfair use and dissemination of economic information obtained in
confidence); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447-48 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that software shrinkwrap license bound purchaser under Uniform Commercial Code and that
federal Copyright Act did not preempt enforcement).
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Often, the value of a firm is its special knowledge, and this
knowledge may not be an idea protectable by patent or copyright.
If that firm cannot protect that knowledge from immediate
dissemination to competitors, it may not be able to reap the
benefits from the time and money invested in building that
knowledge. If firms are not permitted to construct a reasonable
legal mechanism to protect that knowledge, then the incentive to
engage in the building of such knowledge will be greatly reduced.
Free riders will capture this information at little or no cost and
produce a [cheaper] product.., because [they] will not have to
carry the costs of creating that knowledge in [their] pricing. Faced
with this free rider problem, this information may not be created,
and thus everybody loses."
In the new age of cyberspace, contemporary contract and copyright
law offer inadequate protection for commercially valuable informa-
tion.11 The proliferation of new technologies, such as the Internet
and commercial electronic databases, and the increasing importance
of information commerce challenge fundamental conceptions
concerning the nature of contract and the scope of copyright.
This Comment suggests how the laws of contract and copyright
might better protect the commercial exchange of information.
Specifically, this Comment argues that the law of contract, more so
than copyright law, could be modified to better facilitate information
commerce by providing a legal framework that more closely reflects
the nature of information products and their exchange. Modifying
the law of contract would more readily encourage information
merchants to invest their energies into producing these works
because, as discussed below, copyright law may not soon welcome low
authorship works into its fold. A uniform corpus of law that closely
reflects the commercial practices and expectations of all parties
involved in information transactions would provide the proper
incentive.
1 2
This Comment further contends that copyright law inappropriately
requires all works to exhibit authorial personality, even those works
whose object is not to exhibit creativity, but utility. The prevailing
10. Eden Hanron, 914 F.2d at 561. For further commentary advocating contract law
regulation of electronic data communications, se.e Johnson & Marks, supra note 6, at 513-15.
11. See infra notes 75-106 and accompanying text (describing reasoning behind Seventh
Circuit's recent decision in ProCD that upheld software license's restrictions on use of
uncopyrightable portions of telephone number compilation).
12. See infra notes 107-74 and accompanying text (suggesting that transactions of
information are more appropriately labeled licenses than sales, and concluding that codification
of commercial licensing law under U.C.C. Article 2B is advantageous to continued common law
development).
1642
THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION COMMERCE
judicial interpretation of modern U.S. copyright law fails to guarantee
protection to works of information and other utilitarian works of high
labor but low creative authorship. The law would be more true to its
historical origins if it recognized a binary approach to copyright
protection that (1) protects the author's expression in high
authorship works, and (2) protects the author's commercial invest-
ment in low authorship or utilitarian works.'"
Part I of this Comment discusses contemporary developments
highlighting the increasing importance of information commerce.
Part II examines how contract and copyright law currently treat
information transactions. Part III analyzes how existing contract law
may present obstacles to the development of information commerce.
Part IV turns to the sphere of copyright law and proposes a copyright
theory for the protection of utilitarian works, which most recently
have been largely neglected. Finally, Part V proposes changes to
copyright and contract law that might best foster information
commerce.
I. THE CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY GRowm- IN INFORMATION
COMMERCE
A. Background
When fully implemented, the NII will offer the public many
commercial, educational, cultural, and technological opportunities. 4
As information commerce grows over this digital medium, lawmakers
will need to balance the rights and liabilities of its users."5 The NII's
success will rest on the protection of information suppliers' rights 6
13. See infra notes 175-204 and accompanying text (examining copyright law's historical
treatment of utilitarian works of low authorship).
14. SeeWHiTE PAPER, supra note 1, at 7-9 (describing range of potential resources NII may
incorporate that will enhance lives of consumers); see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What
It Will Do, 104 YALE LJ. 1805, 1807 (1995) (forecasting that "[c]ontrol over what is said and
heard will shift from intermediaries ... to speakers and listeners themselves" because of
electronic technology). Some commentators have speculated that direct communications over
electronic media will completely supplant certain types of publishing. See, ag., Andrew M.
Odiyzko, Tragic Loss or Good Riddance? The Impending Demise of Traditional Scholarly Journals,
NOTICES OF AM. MATHEmATICAL SOC'Y,Jan. 1995,.at 49,52 (predicting that traditional scholarly
journals will eventually be replaced by on-line versions).
15. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the Frst Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic
Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 65, 65-66 (1992) ("The legal system is struggling to adapt
traditional doctrines to new market structures and technologies of information production and
distribution."); see also Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for
Defamation Posted By Others, 22 CONN. L. REV. 203, 205 (1989) ("[L]egal issues surrounding
computer bulletin boards comprise a land with no maps and few native guides.").
16. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress authority "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Tunes to Authors ... the exclusive Right to
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as much as the participation of consumers.'7 Modem consumers
possess unprecedented power to disseminate information via
computers and other technological devices."8 Without the proper
tools to protect suppliers' products from unauthorized uses, however,
authors, publishers, and other information providers will be discour-
aged from participating in the electronic marketplace.' 9 Lawmakers
must ensure that suppliers retain the power to condition and enforce
the terms by which they make their products available.
20
Technological advances that make information more readily
available than ever before2 call current copyright and contract
principles into question.2 The challenge confronting lawmakers
today lies in determining how to alter and adapt contract and
their respective Writings and Discoveries") (emphasis added); see also Harper & Row, Publishers
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) ("'If every volume that was in the public interest
could be pirated away by a competing publisher,.., the public would [eventually] have nothing
worth reading.'" (quoting Lionel S. Sobel, Copyight and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?,
in 19 COPYIGHT L Smn'. 43, 78 (American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers eds.,
1971))); cf. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 6 ("[What will drive the NII is the content moving
through it.");Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters,
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1995) (agreeing that rights of users
should remain secondary to those of producers in cyberspace because fostering authorship
remains primary goal of copyright regardless of medium employed).
17. SeWHrra PAPER, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that public will not take full advantage of
NI unless it guarantees integrity and useful selection of products and services under reasonable
terms and conditions).
18. See id. (explaining that technological developments enable single individuals to
reproduce and distribute literary works with new found ease and speed); see alsoJoYcE ET AL,
supra note 7, at 21 (pointing out that reproductive technologies become better and cheaper
every year, but creating copyrighted works remains as difficult as ever).
19. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 1467-68 (suggesting that authors will not use digital
media as means of distribution unless electronic information suppliers assure them that their
works will be secure). Explaining that the entrepreneurs of cyberspace ultimately depend on
the participation of authors to provide content, leading literary agent Martin L. Janklow of
Janklow, Nesbit, & Associates states, "[the entrepreneurs of cyberspace] got the highway, but I've
got the cars." Id. at 1467.
20. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that authors may refrain from exposing
works electronically because of piracy fears); see also Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 1467, 1499
(stating that authors will not travel information superhighway unless they have some assurance
that theirjourney will not turn into hijacking); cf JOYCE Er AL., supra note 7, at 21 ("[] he art
of creation has no fast-forward button. Today's author would expend no less time and no lesser
expense to produce War and Peace than Tolstoy did a century ago.").
21. Technological advances in particular may alter the effectiveness of copyright law. See
WHiTE PAPER, supra note 1, at 7 (suggesting that changes in technology, generating new
industries and methods for reproduction and dissemination of works, will present new
opportunities but create additional challenges).
22. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Proprietary R ghts in Digital Data: The Future of Copyright and
Contract Law in a Networked World 41 FED. B. NEWS &J. 511, 512 (1994) (noting that case law
suggests that copyrights attach to most data on Internet and predicting that on-line data
suppliers will continue to supplement copyright protection with contract, especially to protect
unauthorized use of digital fact-based databases and to countermand technological advances,
such as hypertext, that simplify copying).
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The NII's evolution will be closely tied to that of the Internet.
24
Originally developed by the National Science Foundation and the U.S.
Department of Defense to facilitate electronic mail and bulletin board
exchanges within the scientific research community, the Internet
today connects a vast number of computers that can share informa-
tion among millions of users. 6 Characterized as a "network of
networks," the Internet has rapidly expanded with the growth of open
on-line services and new media markets? Commercial use of the
Internet continues to accelerate as well.28
As a forerunner to the Nil, the Intemet is a valuable testing ground
for emerging legal issues concerning digital commerce. 9 Although
the on-line community has employed relatively informal methods of
23. SeeO'Rourke, supranote 22, at 512 (forecasting that Congress will be facedwith difficult
questions, such as validity of contracts that effectively nullify fair use provisions of Copyright
Act); cf. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447-48 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing
enforceability of shrinkwrap license attached to sale of uncopyrightable software database).
24. See High-Performance Computing Act of 19911, 15 U.S.C. § 5511 (1994) (establishing
National Research and Education Network ("NREN") and authorizing it to build upon Internet
model); see also O'Rourke, supra note 22, at 511 (predicting that some vestiges of Internet model
will be retained by Nil).
25. See O'Rourke, supra note 22, at 511 (providing brief history of Internet).
26. See Computer Networks: Webbed Fingers, THE ECONOMIST, Feb., 5, 1994, at 86 (reporting
that there are 15 million users connected by Internet worldwide); see also Priscilla A. Walter &
Eric H. Sussman, Protecting Commercially Developed Information on the NREN, COMPUTER LAW., Apr.
1993, at 1, 2 (estimating that more than 25 million individuals have used the Internet, including
15 million in the United States alone).
27. See Kent D. Stuckey, Market Without Bounds-So Far Could Old Laws Put a Crimp on
Cyberspace?, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 52, 54; see also O'Rourke, supra note 22, at 511
(explaining that Internet now facilitates publication of electronic journals and allows users to
access wide variety of information in physically remote databases); National Writers Union,
Freelance Witers and Online Commerce: A Position Paper of the National Writers Union (visitedJuly 29,
1996) <http://www.nlightning.com/e-money.htnl> (stating that new technologies make it
possible for on-line readers to make direct digital purchases); cf. Stuckey, supra, at 55 (observing
that increasing numbers of commercial transactions for traditional goods and services, as well
as electronic information products, represents new sources of revenue).
28. See Stuckey, supra note 27, at 55 (describing heightened commercial use of Internet
resulting from decreased transaction charges and lower costs of on-line connect time); see also
Pamela Samuelson & RobertJ. Glushko, Intelletual Prperty PdghtsforDigital Libraty and Hypertext
Publishing Systems; 6 HAR. J.L. & TECi. 237, 242-47 (1995) (noting rise of commercial services
on Internet).
29. See SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, ONLINE LAW: THE SPA'S LEGAL GUIDE TO
DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET 19 (ThomasJ. Smedinghoff ed., 1996). Issues confronting
those interested in setting up a website include:- Who owns the information on the website?
Does advertising or promotional use of a website conflict with applicable state and federal
regulations? How should current contract law develop in order to accommodate the increasing
use of the Internet for the buying and selling of goods and services? See id.
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dispute resolution to date,' those may not suffice in the commercial
sphere of on-line communication. As commercial entities invest
more resources in promoting digital commerce, the demand for
clearer rules, remedies, and relationships will increase. 2
II. CONTEMPORARY CONTRACT AND COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES
APPLICABLE TO INFORMATION COMMERCE
A. Contract Law under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
For nearly fifty years the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") has
served as the backbone of commercial contract law. Originally
promulgated in 1951, every state but Louisiana adopted the U.C.C. by
1968.11 The U.C.C. sought to establish greater uniformity among the
commercial laws of the states in order to accommodate the burgeon-
ing number of interstate transactions, 4 a need that the United Sates
first felt in the nineteenth century as commerce between states
created a national market economy.
3 5
Commercial priorities at the time of the U.C.C.'s inception36
prompted its drafters to address the tender and delivery of a tangible
item in Article 2.3 Although historical reasons supported this
30. See Samuelson & Glushko, supra note 28, at 244 (discussing informal social code
governing behavior among on-line actors, known as "netiquette"); see also O'Rourke, supra note
22, at 511-12 (hypothesizing that informal methods of dispute resolution present on Intemet
devolved from conduct of original actors, members of community who utilized network as means
of circulating and evoking response to scholarly literature).
31. See O'Rourke, supra note 22, at 512 (predicting demise of informal dispute resolution
as more lucrative commercial, royalty-bearing data appears on-line).
32. This trend will only be magnified by the NII's economic objectives. See INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., NAT'L INFO. INFRASTRUC-
TURE: AGENDA FOR ACTION 3-4 (1993) (forecasting enhanced American ability to compete in
global economy upon realization of Nil's objectives). For an interesting discussion identifying
which conditions lend themselves to the use of social norms in resolving disputes, see ROBERT
C. ELUaCSON, ORDERWrrnouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SErrLE DIsPUTES (1991) (proposing that
laws become preferable over social norms when social distance between disputants increases,
magnitude of interests rise, and legal system provides opportunity for disputants to externalize
costs to third parties).
33. See CHARLES L KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, RULES OF CONTRACT LAw 2 (1993).
34. See id. at 1 (explaining that number of business transactions across state boundaries
increased dramatically in nineteenth century).
35. See id. at 1-2 (describing motive of U.C.G. drafters to foster greater uniformity among
states on commercial subjects).
36. See generally Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE LJ.
1341, 1347-48, 1351 (1948) (discussing fiflure of existing laws to sufficiently govern realities of
commercial transactions in goods at time of U.C.C.'s creation).
37. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1341 (explaining that this format presents a goods bias and
a focus on sales). Goods are "things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
moveable at the time of identification to the contract...." U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1995). "A 'sale'
consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price .... " Id. § 2-106(1)
(1995); see infra note 109 (providing full U.C.C. definition of 'goods').
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choice,' "the emphasis on goods as the centerpiece of contract law
and economic exchange reflects an industrial economy that no longer
exists."3" Manufacturing industries increasingly have moved offshore;
in their stead, services, information, and technology markets have
taken center stage in modern commerce.' Despite this trend, the
law has been slow to abandon Article 2's preference for conceptualiz-
ing commercial transactions as sales of goods.4
1. Licensing and the shrinkwrap license
Information suppliers, aware that conventional laws regarding the
sale of goods poorly address the new issues raised by the commercial
exchange of information,4' have used licensing as their primary
contractual framework.' The software industry, in particular, has
embraced the use of licenses in the commercial exchange of software
programs.44  Such licenses have taken two forms: negotiated
agreements for customized software, and standardized "shrinkwrap
licenses" for mass-marketed software.'
The term "shrinkwrap licenses" refers to the fact that these licenses
begin when the purchaser reads their terms and tears open the
transparent plastic wrapping, or "shrinkwrap," that encloses the
software product.46 Although early shrinkwrap licenses often were
visible prior to purchase, and could be read before the purchaser tore
open the software's wrapping, more recent variants place the license
within the software's packaging or on the disk itself.47 Such a license
38. See Gilmore, supra note 86, at 1342-47 (discussing historical roots of English commercial
law and practices).
39. Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1341-42.
40. See id. at 1342.
41. See infra notes 130-57 and accompanying text (describing tendency of law to analyze
transactions under sale of goods model); cf. DONALD A. MARCHAND & FOREST W. HORTONJR.,
INFOTRENDS: PROFrNG F]ROMYOUR INFORMATION RESOURCES 19 (1986) (explaining that United
States business and commerce "have been living with the consequences of an information
economy for many years," yet refuse to abandon traditional views of economic change).
42. SeeNimmer, supra note 5, at 1339 (stating that information transactions require separate
treatment under U.G.C. because ofcommercially significant differences between intangibles and
goods, as well as licenses and sales).
43. See Raymond T. Nimnier, Article 2B Issues: Meeting the Information Age (visited June 8,
1997) <http://wwsv.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/0503/nat.issu.htnl> (stating that licensing is primary
contract framework in many information industries).
44. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinwap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239,
1239 (1995) ("Software vendors are attempting en masse to 'opt out' of intellectual property law
by drafting license provisions that compel their customers to adhere to more restrictive
provisions than copyright ... law would require.").
45. See id. (pointing out that shrinkwrap licenses have predominated because most software
is mass-marketed).
46. See id. at 1241 (discussing different types of shrinkwrap licenses).
47. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
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purports to take effect when the purchaser retains the software after
having an opportunity to inspect the license.4
Whether shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable as part of a valid
contract remains unclear.49 Like many other licenses, shrinkwrap
licenses often claim to grant the consumer not ownership but
possession of a copy of the program, subject to certain restrictions on
copying and distribution." Approximately two-thirds of the respon-
dents polled in a recent survey of computer law professionals agreed
that shrinkwrap licenses accompanying mass-marketed products
should be enforceable.5 The courts have reached no consensus on
the question, however, offering varying rationales for enforcement
and non-enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses.
52
48. See id.
49. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing controversy surrounding validity
of shrinkwmp licenses).
50. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 1472 n.23 (outlining legal aspects of shrinkwrap
licenses); see also Lemley, supra note 44, at 1241-48 (describing typical terms and rights granted
by shrinkwrap licenses).
51. SeeMaryjo Howard Dively, Transactions in Information, 454 PLI/Pat 211,273 n.1 (citing
Michael Rustad et al., An Empirical Analysis of Software Licensing Law and Practice, 10 COMPUTER
L. ASS'N BuL 8 (1995)).
52. Compare ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53 (analyzing acceptance of shrinkwrap license under
U.C.C. § 2-204 and § 2-606 and allowing seller to include terms of license merely by referring
to them at time of sale), with Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d
Cir. 1991) (treating shrinkwrap license as either written confirmation under U.C.C. § 2-207 or
attempted modification under U.C.C. § 2-209 of parties' contract and denying enforcement
because both provisions require that both parties intend to adopt any additional terms). See
Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763-66 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(enforcing terms of shrinkwrap license thatpurchaser knewabout at time of contract formation
but refusing to enforce same license when injected after formation of contract because both
parties did not intend to adopt it).
For further discussion ofshrinkwrap licenses, see David L. Hayes, ShrinkrapLicenseAgreements:
New Light on a VexingProbler, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 653 (1993) (discussing shrinkwrap
licenses in context of Step-SaverData Sys.); Lemley, supra note 44, at 1241-59 (discussing history
and status of shrinkwrap licenses under law); David W. Maher, The Shrink-Wrap License: Old
Problems in a New Wrapper, 34J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 292 (1987) (examining the validity of statutes
purporting to enforce shrinkwrap licenses); Richard H. Stem, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass
Marketed Software: Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Darki, 11 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
LJ. 51 (1985) (discussing components ofshrinkwrap licenses and their effectiveness); RAYMOND
T. NmmER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGy 6.17 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing licensing
agreements and the differences between fully-negotiated contracts and mass, consumer-oriented
transactions).
An interesting question is whether information transmitted directly to a consumer's computer
by electronic means will face the same licensing problems encountered by physical exchanges
of software over a retail counter. SeePriscilla A. Walter and GailJ. Berritt, TheElctronic Contract:
A Primer on Making it Enforceable, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 23, 27 (noting that electronic
delivery imposes no obligation on purchasers to pay before they have accepted all terms, and
inflicts no inconvenience in returning source of data if they refuse to accept the terms).
Information exchanged electronically may escape some of the problems associated with the
shrinkwrap license. See id. First, an information provider may display all the terms of a contract
on the consumer's computer screen before any purchase is made. See id. Second, delivery of
the product may be withheld until the offeree manifests his assent to the terms. See id,
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2. Revisions considered to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
The Article 2 Drafting Committee is currently working to recon-
struct Article 2 of the U.C.C. in order to promulgate a new article
encompassing transactions involving licenses of information and
software in recognition of the special problems raised by commerce
in information works and related commodities. 3 In 1993, the
Drafting Committee concluded that it would revise Article 2 following
a "hub and spoke" model. This model would consist of a central
"hub" chapter that would discuss general contract principles, and
separate "spoke" chapters, which would treat individual differences
between conventional goods and information transactions.54  This
hub and spoke model acknowledges that, although distinctions may
be drawn between the licensing of information and the sale of goods,
they share common ground."
B. Copyright Law and the Implications of "Low Authorship" in Works of
Information5 6
The U.S. Constitution states that the primary purpose of copyright
law is "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."" The
law strives to achieve this objective by striking a balance between
society's interest in the creation of new works and authors' needs to
secure a return for their efforts.5" To this end, copyright law endows
53. See Nimmer, supra note 43 (explaining evolution of Article 2 Drafting Committee and
stating that scope of Article 2B will be limited to transactions involving licenses of information
and software).
54. See id. One spoke of this wheel has already been completed and designated Article 2A,
Leases. See i. The spoke encompassing licenses is known as Article 2B. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B, Licenses
(Draft) (May 5, 1997) <http://ww.law.uh.edu/ucc2b/050597/0505-26.html> (visitedJune 18,
1997) [hereinafter U.C.C.-Licenses].
55. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1339-40 (emphasizing that any codification must address
both commonalities and differences between transactions in goods and intangibles). For further
elaboration on the "hub and spoke" configuration, see Nimmer, supra note 4, at 293 (discussing
differences between transactions of ordinary goods and software transactions that may or may
not include transfer of tangible items); Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten
Sector of CommercialLaw, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 726-27 (1993) (arguing for a code that covers
licensing of intangibles as well as sale of goods, and discussing appropriateness of hub-and-spoke
approach to achieve this goal).
56. Jane Ginsburg coined the term "low authorship." SeeJane C. Ginsburg, Creation and
Commercial Value. Copyight Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1865, 1866
(1990).
57. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; cf. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975) (noting that ultimate purpose of copyright law is "to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good").
58. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating
that scope of copyright "involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors ... in the
control and exploitation of their writings... on the one hand, and society's competing interest
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the creators of qualifying works with a bundle of exclusive rights59
that permit them to prohibit others' use of their creations for a
limited period of time.'
Works of information do not easily qualify for copyright protection
as "original works of authorship."6" Although originality is a well-
established prerequisite to protection,' current copyright law
considers a work sufficiently original only when it manifests traits of
"high authorship," subjective or creative elements that reveal the
author's own personal influence.63 Works of information, though
commercially valuable, generally are deemed works of "low author-
ship" containing little personal expression.' Their value lies in the
fact that they are accurate and useful, rather than fanciful or creative.
65
in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other"); see also 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.1, at 4-9 (1989) (stating that CopyrightAct seeks
to achieve its objective by inducing creators to produce and disseminate literary works while
allowing others to utilize these works in their own endeavors).
59. Among these rights are: (1) the right to reproduce copies of the work; (2) the right
to distribute those copies; (3) the right to publicly perform or display the work; and (4) the
right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
The Copyright Act defines "copies" as "material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any
method.., and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicat-
ed, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id § 101. For a discussion of how
these rights apply to copyright in cyberspace, see Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 1475-88.
60. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990) (noting that if creator dies before
renewal of copyright, his rights terminate); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156
("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the public
good."); cf. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists... in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.").
62. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("The sine
qua non of copyright is originality."); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58
(1884) (authorizing copyright of photographs because they were "representatives of original
intellectual conceptions of the author"); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365,
1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that originality is "premise of copyright law"); 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAViD NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.06[A] (1996) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT] (describing
originality as statutory and constitutional prerequisite to infringement action). To be considered
original, a work must be an independent creation of an author that demonstrates some degree
of creativity. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (describing collective works such as encyclopedias as "a number
of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves... assembled into
a collected whole"); Feis, 499 U.S. at 345 ("Original ... means only that the work was
independently created by the author.., and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity."); COPYRIGHT, supra, at § 2.01[A],(B] ("originality necessary to support a copyright
merely calls for independent creation").
63. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1866 (describing scope of copyright as extending
comfortably only to works evincing "personal authorial presence" or "authorial personality").
64. See id. (characterizing directories, indices and databases as personality-deprived
information compilations). "[L]ow authorship works offer little to protect beyond the
information." Id. at 1915.
65. Works of information are often collections of factual material or lists of data. See
National Bus. Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89,92,97 (N.D. Il. 1982). Such
information is considered preexisting material discovered, not created by the finder. See id. at
92. As a result, judicial officers most likely would not find such works original as presently
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Although an author may not copyright the individual facts66 or
ideas67 recited in his work,68 the Copyright Act of 1976 does protect
compilations of information if the author has contributed to the
preexisting uncopyrightable material within the compilation. 9  In
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,70 the Supreme
Court declared that a sufficient contribution is present when the work
evinces originality either by the presence of creative expression within
the work or by the selection or arrangement of the preexisting
material.7 The Court clearly endorsed conditioning copyright
conceptualized. See id. at 92-97 (observing that value of compilation resides in its "collection of
information, not its arrangement. If [its) protection is limited solely to the form of expression,
the economic incentives underlying the copyright laws are largely swept away... [Given the
nature of] electronic compilations... an emphasis upon arrangement and form ... becomes
even more meaningless than in the past."); see alsoJ.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied
Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42
VAND. L. REv. 639, 684 (1989) ("[S]ubjective personalization in the utilitarian milieu tends to
produce white elephants that are either dysfunctional or readily undersold by products built
around more streamlined or standardized solutions.").
66. See, e-g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (stating that fact does not owe its creation to act of
original authorship by the person who first discovers it); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,556 (1985) ("No author may copyright... the facts he narrates");
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 58 (deciding that one who discovers fact is not its
"maker" or "originator"); COPYRGHT, supra note 62, at §§ 2.11[A], 2-172.16 ("No one may claim
originality as to facts."); cf. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theoty for the
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516, 525 (1981) (arguing that some
collections of data represent original authorship).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection... extend to any idea").
68. The idea/expression and fact/expression dichotomy of copyright law compounds the
information suppliers' problems. Copyright law allows 'second-comers' to extract and
manipulate facts and ideas any work, even if the original author first discovered or articulated
them: "[N]o matter how much original authorship the work displays, the facts and ideas it
exposes are free for the taking; the copyright may cover only the facts and ideas as they are
presented by the author." Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1868. This is precisely why the defendant
in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg could extract ProCD's information database from its CD-Rom
program and use it independently without infringing the software copyright. See ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). Federal copyright law offered ProCD no
protection whatsoever against this activity. For more discussion of this case, see infra notes 75-
106 and accompanying text.
69. See17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining compilation as "awork... of preexisting materials
or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship"); see also id. § 103(b) ("The copyright...
extends only to the material contributed by the author.., and does not imply any exclusive
right in the preexisting material.").
70. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
71. SeeFeist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,361 (1991) (holding that
names, towns, and telephone numbers of utility's subscribers were uncopyrightable facts, not
having been selected, coordinated, or arranged in minimally original way to qualify for copyright
protection); see also COPYRIGHT, supra note 62, at §§ 2.11[D], 2-172.24. But cf Denicola, supra
note 66, at 531 (stating that if database "is to be afforded copyright protection, it must of
necessity attach to the assemblage of information itself").
Under Harper & Row, a compilation containing no protectible written expression will meet
the minimal degree of originality for copyright protection if it features an original selection or
arrangement. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547. Because a compilation's copyright protects
only against unauthorized uses of the work as a whole, however, it does not extend to individual
facts. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
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protection on the presence of subjective input by the author.
72
Moreover, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that copyright law
rewards the industriousness of authors.71 Its holding endorsed a
unitary, high authorship74 interpretation of the scope of copyright.
C. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,75 a case recently decided by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, illustrates the difficulties
commercial information suppliers presently face in securing legal
protection for their fact-based products. The court in ProCD dealt
with two issues: (1) whether a "shrinkwrap" license, purporting to
restrict the uses a purchaser could make of a mass-marketed software
program, created a contract binding the purchaser to its terms, and
(2) whether, even if the license created a valid contract, the federal
Copyright Act preempted state enforcement of its terms.76 Reversing
the trial court on both questions, the Seventh Circuit held that the
licensing agreement bound the purchaser, and that federal copyright
law did not preempt enforcement of the contract under state law.77
The plaintiff, ProCD, had spent more than $10 million to compile
information from more than 3,000 telephone directories into a
computer database, which it offered to potential consumers on CD-
ROM under the name SelectPhoneM.7 1 In order to reach multiple
elements of the market, ProCD offered its product at a lower price to
the general public than it did to commercial purchasers.79  ProCD
72. See Feist 499 U.S. at 363, 347 (declaring that "copyright protects only those constituent
elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity" and stating that
facts do not possess sufficient originality because they are merely discovered, not created). In
addition, the Court claimed its decision rested on Constitutional grounds, interpreting the words
"writings" and "authors" to require a degree of "independent creation plus a modicum of
creativity." Id at 346.
73. See id. at 364 (stating "copyright rewards originality, not effort" and holding that
telephone database arranged alphabetically not sufficiently original to qualify for copyright
protection).
74. A high authorship theory of copyright protection is one that requires the presence of
the author's own personal taste or style in the work created. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at
1866.
75. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
76. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
77. See id. at 1454.
78. See id. at 1449.
79. Although manufacturers and retailers could benefit commercially from the type of
specialized information that SelectPhone offered, the value to those having nothing to sell would
lie exclusively in their own personal use. See id. As the court indicated, consumers in the
general public might purchase the database as an electronic substitute for the local phone book
or for calling long distance information, but not at the same price commercial purchasers would
pay. See id.
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turned to licensing as a method of preventing commercial purchasers
from purchasing SelectPhoneT at the cheaper price.
80
On every box sold to consumers, ProCD advertised that the
purchase and use of SelectPhoneTM was subject to restrictions
enumerated on an enclosed license.81 Inside the box, the consumer
could find the license printed in the product manual.82
SelectPhoneT also encoded the terms of its license on the CD-ROM;
computer screens reminded the user of its provisions before allowing
him or her to proceed."8 The license informed the buyer that
SelectPhoneTM's software was copyrighted and purported to restrict
the ways in which its information could be used. 4 These restrictions
included a prohibition on copying and distributing the software
program and telephone database.8
5
After purchasing SelectPhoneT, defendant Zeidenberg copied its
listings to a computer's hard drive and developed his own program
for accessing the listings, which he resold at a lower price over the
Internet through a corporation founded for this purpose, Silken
Mountain Web Services." Zeidenberg later purchased two updated
versions of the database and made the revised information available
over the Internet as well. 7
ProCD sued Zeidenberg, claiming that his actions constituted
copyright infringement and breached the SelectPhoneTM software
license.' Zeidenberg countered that copyright law does not protect
facts such as the phone numbers arranged in SelectPhone TM and,
therefore, did not condemn his actions.8 9 Zeidenberg further con-
tended that the license agreement did not bind him, and that even
if it did, federal copyright law preempted the enforcement of ProCD's
state law contract claim."
80. See id. at 1450. ProCD was faced with the difficult choice of either setting a high price
to compensate for resales of its database, which would restrict its market among private users,
or setting a low price more attractive to the general public that would incur a greater risk of
uncompensated resales. See id. at 1449. For a general discussion of the problems of information
suppliers in the absence of copyright protection, see Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1918-22
(discussing how copyright law would work in absence of copyright liability).
81. See ProCD, 86 F.Sd at 1450.
82. See id.
83. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447
(7th Cir. 1996).
84. See id. at 644-45.
85. See id. at 645.
86. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
87. See id.
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The district court ruled in favor of Zeidenberg, rejecting the
contract claim on the ground that the license's terms were unavailable
to the defendant at the time of purchase.91 The court held that the
terms of the license would be incorporated into the parties' agree-
ment only if the party to be bound could "read and consider the
terms in their entirety" before purchasing the software.92 According
to the court, merely referring to the terms at the time of contract
formation did not provide ample opportunity to consider whether
they were acceptable.93
The Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court, supporting ProCD's
right to condition use of SelectPhoneTM upon acceptance of the
license, as well as its right to invite Zeidenberg's acceptance by
conduct.94  The court considered such conditional offers, coupled
with the buyer's opportunity to reject the goods after inspection of
their quality and limitations,95 to be valuable to sellers and purchas-
ers alike. 96 This method of contracting, the court noted, already
finds frequent application in a number of industries today.97
Turning to the second issue, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the
district court that SelectPhoneTM's database fell within the subject
matter of copyright law,98 but lacked sufficient originality, either in
91. See id. at 654.
92. See id. The court reached this decision by considering previous case law dealing with
similar transactions. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 104-05, n.45 (3d
Cir. 1991) (acknowledging "distinction between conspicuous disclaimers made available before
the contract is formed and disclaimers made available only after the contract is formed"); see also
Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 763-66 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(invalidating license because contract commenced before purchaser became aware of vendor's
insistence on incorporation of its terms); McCrimmon v. Tandy Corp., 414 S.E.2d 15, 18 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1991) (enforcingwarranty disclaimer when purchaser had opportunity to read it before
entering into contract).
93. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 654. The court also held that, having failed to become part
of the original agreement, the license could not modify the parties' contract under U.C.C. § 2-
207(2) (proposals for addition to a contract) or § 2-209 (proposed modifications of a contract),
because these provisions require the express assent of the party to be bound. See id. at 655.
94. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir.) (stating that Zeidenberg
could have prevented formation of contract by returning package after reading license), revu
908 F. Supp. 640 (1996); cf. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) ("A contract for sale of goods may be made in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of such a contract.").
95. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453 (asserting that opportunity to return goods can be
important); U.C.C. § 2-606 (stating that purchaser accepts goods after having opportunity to
inspect them and failing to make effective rejection).
96. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453 (suggesting that presentation of all terms at time of contract
formation, including warranties and license restrictions, would result in buyer foregoing more
useful information about product, like its capabilities and compatibility with purchaser's needs).
97. See id. at 1457 (citing examples of contracts being formed before communication of
every term in insurance, airline, concert, consumer product, drug, and software industries).
98. See id. at 1453; ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 647.
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content or arrangement, to qualify for its protection.99 Both courts
then considered whether federal copyright law preempted enforce-
ment of the license under state contract law.00 The circuit court
overruled the district court on this historically controversial preemp-
tion issue,'' holding that the federal copyright statute did not
preempt ProCD's enforcement of their state contract.'
The Seventh Circuit's defense of ProCD's right to contract around
federal copyright law0 3 is limited insofar as the court applied Feist's
mandate that copyright only protects works exhibiting personal
authorship.'" In the absence of a valid contract, the personality
concept of copyright-worthy material will continue to exclude works
of information such as ProCD's database from the aegis of copyright
law.0 5 For such works, copyright still fails "to secure the commer-
99. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453; ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 650.
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994) (placing all legal and equitable rights that are equivalent
to any right within general scope of copyright under exclusive governance of Copyright-Act and
preempting entitlement to those rights under common law or statute of any state); ProCD, 86
F.3d at 1453; ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 656.
101. Section 301 of the Copyright Act articulates Congress' intent to make federal law the
exclusive source of protection for all works within the subject matter of copyright:
all.., rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright... and come within the subject matter of copyright.., are exclusively
governed by this title ... [and] no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301.
It is not clear whether section 301 would allow a contract to extend state protection over such
material. Despite the statute's plain language, its legislative history indicates that private
contracts should not be preempted. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976) (revealing
Congressional intent behind § 301 of Copyright Act not to "derogate from the rights of parties
to contract with each other and to sue for breaches of contract").
While the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress may preempt the enforcement of
contracts, it has also suggested that courts should construe such clauses to exclude the
preemption of private agreements. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S.
117, 129 (1991) (stating that Congress has power to preempt enforcement of contracts); David
A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Poli: Federal Preemption of Software License
ProhibitionsAgainstReverseEnginerng 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 543, 602-16 (1992) (discussing unclear
nature and limits of § 301's preemptive authority). But see American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
513 U.S. 219, 232-33 (1995) (stating that although Congress could preempt enforcement of
private contracts over areas in which it has chosen to exclude state lawmaking, courts usually
read preemption clauses to leave private agreements unaffected). For more cases concerning
federal preemption, see, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152
(1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-93 (1974); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234,237 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
228-31 (1964).
102. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454-55.
103. See id. at 1455.
104. See id. (citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
105. See id. (assuming ProCD's database is uncopyrightable even though "it is more complex,
contains more information... is organized differently, and therefore is more original than the
single alphabetical directory at issue" in Feist).
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cial value of these kinds of endeavors, even though the demand for
productions such as directories and databases is ever increasing."1" 6
III. INFORMATION CONTRACTs: A SITE STILL UNDER
CONSTRUCTION
In some ways, information agreements are analogous to newly-
opened World Wide Web sites present on the Internet that flash,
"This Site Still Under Construction!" Visitors cannot predict what the
Web site will look like, but with the increasing popularity of the
medium we can be reasonably certain that it will come to completion
someday. Similarly, it is unclear how the law will shape the formation
of information contracts, 07 but as private actors exchange an
increasing amount of information in new ways, legislators and courts
will surely continue to refine this legal tool.10
A. Information Commerce: Exchanging Intangibles
Information commerce differs in two fundamental, legally signifi-
cant ways from traditional commerce. First, information products do
not neatly fit into the contemporary concept of a "good" under
Article 2 of U.C.C.,'" even though they are often treated as
such."0 Unlike goods, information is an intangible commodity."'
Though it may be recorded in tangible form, the information's
physical embodiment may not limit the extent to which it can be pos-
sessed.12  Indeed, a single piece of information may be possessed
or used by thousands at a time, regardless of the number of tangible
copies in existence."
Second, information commerce differs from traditional commerce
in the nature of property rights that attach upon transfer."4
106. Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1869.
107. Seegnera/yJohnson & Marks, supra note 6, at 487, 488-89 nn.5-6 (advocating application
of basic principles of fairness and justice, rather existing legal metaphors, to determine rights
and duties of participants in electronic networking communities).
108. See id. (stating that cyberspace is "relatively undeveloped and many of its possibilities
remain unexplored").
109. Under the current U.C.C. definition, "goods" are defined as "all things ... which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the
price is to be paid...." U.C.C. § 2-105 (1995); see Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1339 (stating that
there are numerous problems with Article 2 governing information licenses because the body
of law was drafted for sales of goods).
110. See infra notes 130-57 and accompanying text (describing tendency of courts to treat
information transactions as conventional sales of goods).
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Information may be delivered without loss of possession or con-
trol,115 for as one commentator wrote, "information can be used
without being used up and can be sold without being given up.""
6
Thus, a purchaser who seeks an exclusive right to control certain
information must exact from the seller an obligation to neither use
nor transfer it in the future." 7 Even with these assurances, however,
the buyer's exclusive right is not guaranteed."' The seller may
breach his agreement, or others may discover the information from
a separate source." 9 Such restraints create difficulties unknown in
the sale of goods, as the parties must determine whether they
bargained for the right to exclusive use of the information, or merely
the right to share in its use with others.
20
B. Characterizations of Information Exchange
1. No sale! The licensing of software and related information prducts
Today the formation and authentication of electronic information
agreements is closely associated with software licensing. 12' Conse-
quently, it is useful to discuss the software industry's attempts to
safeguard its intellectual property from unauthorized use. As ProCD
demonstrates, one such technique has been to characterize informa-
tion transactions as licenses rather than sales. 22
Licensing owes its origin, in large part, to the "first sale" doctrine
in federal copyright law. The Copyright Act of 1976 originally allowed
the purchaser of a copy of any copyrighted work to "sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy" without the copyright holder's
consent." Software producers were concerned that under this
doctrine, rental companies would purchase a program and lease
copies to consumers who would then make their own copy rather







121. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1342-43 (including information and software within scope
of licensing contract's subject matter and analyzing U.C.C. Article 2 applicability to "software or
other intangibles").
122. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
123. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-553, § 109(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2548 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994)).
124. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting
that under first sale doctrine one could buy copy of computer program and lease or lend it to
another without infringing copyright on program).
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the specter of pursuing expensive action against individual consumers
because the first sale doctrine barred suits against the rental compa-
nies."5
In order to avoid the first sale doctrine and establish a basis in state
contract law for preventing unauthorized uses, producers began
characterizing software transactions as transfers of licenses rather than
sales. 26 Although Congress removed the necessity for this measure
in 1990 by prohibiting the rental, loan, or lease of software for
profit,127 licensing has remained the predominant conceptual form
for software transactions."' Moreover, as ProCD demonstrates,
producers continue to rely on licenses as a means of restricting the
commercial uses purchasers may make of information that federal law
would not otherwise prohibit.s
2. Judicial construction of licensing ageements
Most courts have treated licensing transactions of software and
related information products in the manner employed by the Seventh
Circuit in ProCD.' In that case, the court briefly acknowledged
that there may be legally significant distinctions between licenses and
conventional contracts,"' but followed the district court by analyz-
ing the license as an ordinary contract accompanying the sale of
goods under the provisions of the U.C.C.13 Despite some decisions
to the contrary,"'3 the dominant judicial trend is to analyze licenses
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Computer Software RentalAct of1980, § 802(2), 17U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1994)
(amending first sale doctrine to permit only non-profit libraries and educational institutions to
lend or lease copies of software).
128. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1341-43 (discussing distinctions between sales of tangible
goods and licenses of intangible software under U.C.C. Article 2); Raymond Nimmer & Richard
Speidel, Hub and Spoke Concepts in Artice 2: Discussion Memorandum I (presented to the Article
2 Revision Drafting Committee on Sept. 5, 1993) (on file with The American University Law
Review) (concluding that software and similar intangibles transactions should not be simply
incorporated into Article 2 without modification to its sale of goods model).
129. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (establishing that
plaintiffsold uncopyrightable database with shrinkwrap license in order to restrict unauthorized
copying of its contents).
130. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1345-46 (stating that most courts treat software licenses
under Article 2 provisions for sales of goods).
131. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (observing that "[w]hether there are legal differences
between 'contracts' and 'licenses' ... is a subject for another day").
132. See id.
133. See e.g., Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655 (D.S.C.
1970) (holding that contract was not sale of goods within South Carolina's adoption of U.C.C.),
affd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971); Wharton Management Group v. Sigma Consultants, Inc., No.
89C-JA-165, 1990 WL 18360, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct, Jan. 29, 1990) (reasoning that service
element of sale of computers characterizes contract as service and not sale of goods), affd 582
A.2d 936 (Del. 1990); Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. LH. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318
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of software and related information products as conventional sales of
goods."s For the most part, this phenomenon can be explained by
two factors: fear and familiarityJ
Thejudiciary's reluctance to distinguish between sales and licenses
may be explained as a fear of leaving the familiar conceptual structure
of the U.C.C.'s sale of goods provisions.1i 6  Some courts have
justified applying Article 2 to licensing agreements for the sole reason
that these contracts would otherwise be subject to uncodified
common law rules. 37 Other courts have suggested that a sales
model fits poorly, but have nevertheless applied the U.C.C., further
underlining the judiciary's fear of leaving an established body of
law.'3 Some commentators charge that the judiciary's tendency to
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that contract for development and delivery of computer programs
was not sale of goods); Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecomm. & Info. Sys., Inc., 788
S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that contract for installation of used telephone
system was not sale of goods); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that contract for design and development of computer software was
service).
134. See, eg., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991)
(agreeing that U.C.C. § 2-207 governs analysis for computer software program); Advent Sys. Ltd.
v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that software falls within U.C.C.
definition); Hospital Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1360 (D.NJ.
1992) (analyzing hospital computer software system within meaning of sales for breach of
contract claim); In re Amica, Inc., 135 B.R. 534, 545-46 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1992) (finding that
goods include computer programs); Neilson Bus. Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Italo V. Monteleone, M.D.,
PA, 524 A.2d 1172, 1174-75 (Del. 1987) (affirming trial court's finding that lease involving
computer software represented sale of goods); Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software, Inc., 510 So. 2d
1337, 1340 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (assuming that software constitutes goods in holding that
software manufacturer and seller was liable for damages); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys.,
Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that contract for turnkey computer
system was subject to U.C.C.); Drier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1728, 1732 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (acknowledging sale of computer systems involving
hardware and software a "sale of goods" despite incidental service aspects); Communications
Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Civ. Ct. 1988) (asserting that
software, being moveable and tangible, qualified as good under U.C.C.); Schroders, Inc. v.
Hogan Sys., Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 404,406 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding that software license agreement
unrelated to any sale of hardware remained within Article 2 analysis).
135. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (describing courts' reluctance to examine
licenses independent of U.C.C. provisions due to familiarity with statutory framework and
antipathy toward common law).
136. SeeNimmer, supra note 5, at 1346 (noting that common law provides minimal guidance
and is inappropriate basis for analysis).
137. See Step-SaverData Sys., 939 F.2d at 99 (recognizing that common law mirror image rule
would apply to contracts outside the U.C.C.); Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707
F.2d 785, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that law becomes cluttered without abrogation by
codification); see also Dixie Bonded Warehouse & Grain Co. v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 755 F. Supp.
1543,1552 (M.D. Ga. 1991), affrd sub nom Graniteville Co. V. Bleckley Lumber Co., 944 F.2d 819
(l1th Cir. 1991); Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1346 (suggesting that U.C.C. rules provide more
guidance to parties than do common law alternatives).
138. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[N] o one argues
that the terms of the license at issue here are troublesome. .. ."); see also Microsoft Corp. v.
Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (admitting that sale of
copyrighted work by authorized copyright holder may constitute first sale but placing burden
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examine licenses of software and other intangibles under the Article
2 microscope can be attributed to a "goods bias""5 9 that leads courts
to focus on the tangible embodiment of the commodity being ex-
changed.14' This bias has permeated contract law, extending into
analysis of contracts that involve neither tangible goods nor sales
141
as well as policy discussions not involving goods at all.'4 The
judiciary's emphasis on sales reflects its inclination to view transactions
under familiar terms.
3. Intangibles contracts seen through Article 2 glasses: A distinction
blurred
Courts that have analyzed commerce in software and related
intangibles under Article 2 of the U.C.C. may not have considered
fully the relationship of these information transactions to convention-
al transactions in goods." Software is licensed, not sold, as a good;
its value resides in the noncorporeal right to access and use its
contents, not in its tangible embodiment.14
Transactions of information and other intangible products are thus
more appropriately labeled as licenses than sales for two reasons.
145
First, the value of the transaction to the buyer lies in the right to use
the intangible information conveyed, not in the physical items of the
conveyance itself."4  Today's computer technology often renders
the tangible embodiment of an information product nearly valueless
as soon as the purchaser places its contents into his computer's
on defendant to trace its authority to copyright holder).
139. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1341 (describing legal impact of Article 2's inherent focus
on sales of goods).
140. As one court noted:
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but once implanted in
a medium are widely distributed to computer owners .... That a computer program
may be copyrightable... does not alter the fact that once in the form of aifloppy disc
or other medium, the program is tangible, moveable and available in the marketplace.
Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991). Many other courts have
reviewed information commerce and seen, most clearly, a transfer of goods. See supra note 134
(identifying opinions that analyze software under U.C.C. Article 2).
141. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text (explaining how licenses of intangibles
have been inappropriately analyzed under goods framework).
142. See KARL P. SAUVANT, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN SERVICES: THE POLITICS OF
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS 18-22 (1986) (explaining how goods bias has permeated economic
planning and international trade discussions).
143. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (recognizing tendency of courts to treat
information transactions as conventional sales of goods); see alo Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1343
(stating that litigation frequently places intangible transactions in framework meant for sale of
goods).
144. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1345-46.
145. See i&. at 1342-43 (observing that a license conveys to the licensee the ongoing right to
use, access, or modify intangibles without interfering with the licensor's similar right).
146. See id. at 1374.
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memory. 4 Soon, information transactions will occur commonly
without any physical exchange other than the passage of digital ones
and zeroes between computers." In short, the value of the transac-
tion is increasingly less tied to its medium as information commerce
develops." Second, information transactions establish a relation-
ship between the parties that continues beyond the exchange of a
product for consideration. 50 Licenses grant one party a permit to
use property over which another has control or other proprietary
rights."'1 A license thereby authorizes the licensee to use intellectu-
al property in ways that would otherwise infringe the licensor's rights
in the information,"' Thus, unlike a sale in which the parties'
commercial relationship ends upon delivery of the goods, licenses
impose perpetual obligations. 53
4. Sight for sore eyes: A new presctiption for the Uniform Commercial
Code
In May 1996, the U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee promulgated
Draft Article 2B,M a proposal that distinguishes licenses1 55 from
sales15' and establishes an independent article for licensing.
5 7
Although Article 2B surely will be revised,5" it represents a signifi-
cant step toward better protection of information commerce. The
following discussion explains the advantages that this proposed code
147. See id. at 1346.
148. See id at 1375 (describing how software is increasingly stored electronically without use
of magnetic media such as diskettes).
149. See id.
150. See generally id. (stating that licenses regulate behavior over period of time).
151. See id; see also EARL W. KINTNER &JACK LAHR, AN INTELLEcrUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER
63-64 (1975).
152. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1376.
153. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993)
(providing example of software license that purports to restrict licensee's ability to use and
dispose of licensed artide throughout license's life).
154. See U.C.C.-Licenses, supra note 54.
155. See id. § 2B-102(a) (22) (defining license as "a contract for transfer of rights in
information which expressly makes the rights conditional or limited, whether or not it provides
for delivery or sale of a copy of the information").
156. See id. § 2B-102(a) (31) (defining sale as "passing of title to goods or information from
a seller to a buyer for a price"). Note that this definition acknowledges that parties may wish
to sell rather than license information, thereby surrendering all interest they might have in it.
157. See id. §§ 2B-102(a) (16), 2B-103(a) (excluding intangibles from definition of "goods"
and placing licenses of information and software contracts in separate article); see also supra
notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing "hub and spoke" model adopted by Drafting
Committee).
158. See U.C.C.-Licenses, supra note 54 (stating that draft has not been passed by the
National Conference of Commissioners and is based on continuing discussions with consumer
and other groups).
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of commercial licensing law holds over its alternative, continued
common law development.
C. Why Revise? The Preference for Codified Rules of Information
Commerce
The judiciary's extension of Article 2 of the U.C.C. to software
licensing evidences its preference toward codification 1 9 as an
alternative to common law development of contract principles.'16
Information owners turned to licensing because they faced great
difficulty in retaining exclusive control over intangible works. 6
Codification would benefit the development of information com-
merce 62 because the process is more likely to preserve the sanctity
of a contract's terms and result in rules that reflect the commercial
realities and understandings of all parties."6
First, codification produces a uniform system of law upon which
contracting parties may rely before disputes arise. 64 The common
law, conversely, produces a set of hazy lines and contradictory rules
after the need for guidance has already emerged."6
Common law development is best suited to a slower pace and to
developing law in reference to transactions that have local flavor
and are characterized by shared expertise among the contracting
parties. This was the commercial world of the 1700's and 1800's.
Today, local transactions among limited groups of knowledgeable
experts still occur, but modem technology and modem commerce
have created a far less homogenous environment. In this setting,
a premium exists on accessible, commercially relevant, and
understandable principles that guide the transaction. 166
159. SeeNimmer, supra note 5, at 1345-46 (stating that most courts consider software licenses
to fall within Article 2 despite fact that software is not sold, and that its value consists of right
to use software itself and not any tangible embodiment).
160. See id. at 1351 (stating that modem trend favors codification).
161. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text (characterizing information as intangible
good that can be widely disseminated despite existence of few tangible embodiments).
162. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1364-68 (advocating codification of contract principles as
superior alternative to common law development).
163. See genera/ly id. at 1356-67 (explaining superiority of codification process in achieving
goals of commercial contract law).
164. See id. at 1343 (observing that litigation disputing whether U.C.C. Article 2 properly
applies to transactions of intangibles has produced no clear answer).
165. See id at 1352; see also, ag., Glover Sch. & Office Equip. Co. v. Dave Hall, Inc., 372 A.2d
221,223 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (holding that factual circumstances surrounding transaction will
determine whether Article 2 applies); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608, 610-11
(Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that intangibles are not within U.C.C.'s scope); Whitmer v. Bell
Tel. Co., 522 A.2d 584, 587 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (stating that term "goods" includes only
tangible, movable property).
166. Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1351.
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Second, the ability of courts to make rules salient to commercial
practice hinges on the ability of individual judges to understand
commercial realities as presented through the eyes of adversarial
expert witnesses. 67 The codification process, in contrast, takes
place in an open environment where a wide variety of views can be
evaluated outside the context of particular disputes.'a
Finally, the courts have modified contractual terms as often as they
have supported their integrity. 69 "The idea that a court (or jury)
should 'do justice' often conflicts with the idea that contracting
parties are entitled to enforce [their agreements] to the letter."
170
Courts are not in the best position to apply consistent default rules
because they work within a system of "isolated litigation and resolu-
tion of specific disputes."' 7' Although codes do not always guide
parties toward the most efficient behavior,72 they are superior to
the common law in optimizing party behavior. 73 The longevity of
codified provisions may help parties cope with unforeseen events that
affect the ongoing licensing relationship. 74
IV. COPYRIGHT AND INFORMATION COMMERCE
As the ProCD case illustrated, securing profitable returns remains a
primary concern of information suppliers.75 The growth of new
167. See id. at 1365.
168. See id. at 1352 (stating that open dialogue attracts diverse viewpoints, enabling broader
more informed resolution).
169. See id. at 1364 (suggesting that courts fail to consistently support contractual freedom
because of focus on fairness of specific disputes' outcomes). Compare K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1985) (implying additional terms in commercial contract so
as to avoid unreasonable enforcement), and Reid v. Key Bank of S. Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 13 (1st
Cir. 1987) (refusing to alter good faith requirement based on determination that contractual
relationship was adversarial), with Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908
F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (construing terms of contract strictly. "[flirms that have
negotiated contracts are entitled to enforce them to the letter").
170. Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1364.
171. Id. at 1365.
172. See Ian Ayres & Robert Germer, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729, 733 (1992) (noting that certain default rules are "theoretically
efficient," but "there is small hope that lawmakers will be able to divine the [most] efficient rule
in practice").
173. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1339 (arguing that law should encourage flexibility in
contract formation by "allowing parties to define their own relationship and adopt background
or default rules that draw on the shared expertise of actual commercial contracting as a gauge
for what rules aie appropriate," and advancing codification as optimal process for achieving such
goals).
174. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consen 78 VA.
L. REv. 821, 822 (1992) (stating that parties cannot foresee every future contingency at time of
contract formation and that "the knowledge problem ... is likely to increase and the
completeness of their agreement to decrease" as contract duration is extended).
175. Seegenerally Page M. Kaufman, Note, TheEnforceability of State "Shink-wrap"License Statutes
in Light of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 74 CORNELL L. REv. 222, 225 (1988) (stating that
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technologies such as the Internet hinders information providers'
ability to control unauthorized uses of valuable information1 76 and
to enforce copyrights against infringing end-users. 177 The copyright
system, which only protects works demonstrating a subjective authorial
presence, or high amounts of creative authorship, neither consistently
serves copyright's original purposes nor adequately protects many
utilitarian works that facilitate the dissemination of valuable informa-
tion. Rather than continuing to require utilitarian works to evidence
authorial personality, copyright law would better fulfill its purposes
with the adoption of a binary system of protection.
A. A Historical Perspective of Ccpyright-Worthy Wo*s
The advancement of knowledge has always been a central purpose
of copyright law in English and American jurisprudence.' 78 The
first copyright statute in the United States, in fact, considered the
protection of such low authorship works as maps and charts to
promote this purpose. 79 Labor-intensive works of information were
primary goal of software developers is earning profits through sale of their products to
consumers).
176. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,519 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that downloading software program into computer's memory constitutes making of new copy
which will infringe copyright if not licensed).
177. SeeStem, supra note 52, at 57 (stating that detection ofsoftware piracy in individual end
user contexts is extremely difficult and rarely occurs); see also Kaufman, supra note 175, at 225
(explaining that copyright suits, although effective against producers and distributors of
unauthorized software copies, are normally not cost-effective means of protecting intellectual
property rights against numerous individuals).
178. SeeAn Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19, preamble (Eng.) (stating
purpose of act as "the Encouragement of Learned Men to Compose and Write useful Books");
see also U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, c. 8 (granting Congress power "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Tunes to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). As used in the Constitution, "Science"
meant"knowledge." See, eg., WILLIAM CowPFR, CONVERSATION 14 (1781) ("As alphabets in ivory
employ/Hour after hour the yet unletter'd boy/Sorting and puzzling with a deal of glee/Those
seeds of science call'd his ABC"), quoted in 14 OxFORD ENGLISH DICrIoNARY 648 (2d ed. 1989).
The other justification for copyright presented in these enactments-the incentive
justification-received surprisingly little attention from early commentators. See GEORGE T.
CuRsS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COFYRIGHT 20-21 (1847) ("[G]Iory may be the reward of
genius in solitary and irregular cases; but no man ever wrote a spelling-book or compiled an
almanac for that unsubstantial and thankless commodity"); see also EATON S. DRONE, ATREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES 44-45 (1879) (explaining that copyright should protect fruit of author's labor).
179. SeeAct of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.) ("An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.").
These works are "informational and labor-intensive, .. . valued ... for the information they
impart, not for fanciful drafting or personal pictorial peculiarities." Ginsburg, supra note 56, at
1876.
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the subject of much early copyright litigation as well,"s with courts
protecting useful works because of the author's efforts, rather than his
creative or literary contributions."1 Contemporary commentators
echo this theme, linking authorship to industriousness."8 '
Although present in early court decisions as wen," the high
authorship rationale for copyright did not prevent protection of low
authorship works."s The presence of commercial value in utilitari-
an works coexisted with high authorship as ajustification for securing
the privileges of copyright even into this century."t It is within
copyright's traditional prerogative, therefore, to protect both the
subjective expressions of an author's personality and the objective
elements of commercially valuable works that manifest authorial
industriousness. Once copyright law acknowledges that it should
180. See AUGUSrNE BIRRELL, SEVEN LEcruREs ON THE LAW AND HisTORY OF COPYIGHT IN
BooKs 170-71 (1899) (noting that such works as maps, encyclopedias, and legal texts were
frequent subjects of early litigation). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Coprights:
Literary Property in Revolutionay France and America, 64 Tm.. L. REV. 991, 998-1005 (1990)
(discussing political and social reasons for disproportionate presence of informational works in
early United States copyright).
181. See, eg., Longman v. Winchester, 33 Eng. Rep. 987,987-88 (Ch. 1809) (protecting court
calendar on basis of author's industriousness); Matthewson v. Stockdale, 33 Eng. Rep. 103, 105-
06 (Ch. 1806) (upholding protection for calendar because of industriousness and expense
undertaken by author); see also Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1874 (noting that author's original
work is always copyrightable regardless of importance of subject matter).
182. SeeCuRTIS, supranote 178, at 171 (stating that, to claim exclusive privileges of copyright,
author "must show [something] to have been produced by himself- whether it be a purely
original thought or principal .... or a collection, the result of his industry and skill."); see also
DRONE, supra note 178, at 208 (asserting that works are original when they result from
independent labor rather than copying).
183. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ("Personality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something
he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act."); see also Mark Rose, The
Author as Proprietor Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTA-
TIONS 51, 73 (1988) (explaining view that "[ilike two human faces ... two compositions may
resemble each other in various ways, but they will always have some distinguishing characteristics,
some mark of individuality"); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 207 (1890) (examining English courts' protection of letters against
unauthorized publication and concluding that copyright and privacy both represent "a part of
the more general right to the immunity of the person-the right to one's personality.").
184. See, e.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539 (1st Cir. 1905);
Trow Directory, Printing & Bookbinding Co. v. Boyd, 97 F. 586 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); RICHARD
R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITs LAW 69 (1912) (noting that courts have
interpreted copyright laws broadly to include "useful books").
185. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252 ("[]f [works] command the interest of any public, they
have a commercial value ... and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.");
DRONE, supra note 178, at 209-10 (criticizing circuit court's finding that daily price quotations
were unworthy of copyright and arguing that commercial world recognizes the value of such
information, thereby placing it within scope of copyright); see also Ginsburg, supra note 56, at
1890 (arguing that Justice Holmes' fusion of high and low authorship reasoning in Bleistein
"demonstrated the receptivity of copyright to both creativity and commercial value.").
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protect works of low authorship, it must delineate the rights this
protection should accord information providers.
B. The Limitations of Copyright in Low Authorship Works
If history is any lesson, the lights information providers deserve
from their copyrights should not be identical to those given to
individuals whose work manifests a subjective authorial presence. 8
Copyright law's interest in leaving the facts and ideas that lie at the
foundation of all works unguarded precludes equal protection of
works of high authorship and works of information.
18 7
The traditional scope of copyright protection for utilitarian works
was always quite limited. A copyright holder could prohibit others
from copying his work,"s but he could not stop them from making
186. See generaly Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1885-88 (stating that courts traditionally have
distinguished works of authorial presence from derivative works, giving derivative works lower
degree of protection).
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery .... ."); see also DRONE, supra note 178, at 93 (recognizing no
property rights in thoughts, conceptions, ideas, or sentiments).
The close relationship between an idea and its expression has often resulted in functional
works receiving relatively "thin" copyright protection. See, eg., Affiliated Hosp. Prod., Inc. v.
Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1189 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that access and use of
rulebook by competitor in formulating its own rulebook does not constitute copyright infringe-
ment); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1958) (explaining that
use of specific language in business form in certain fields is essential and therefore higher
threshold for copyright infringement must be met); Chamberlain v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d
512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that copyright of rules to game was not infringed by
competitor's statement of rules where similarities between two sets of rules derived from fact that
they were necessarily drawn from same source); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carablo, 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 124, 130-31 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (finding that if only original aspect of work is literal
expression, only nearly identical copy will infringe); LaST Frontier Conference on Copyright
Protection of Computer Software, 30JuRimETRIcSJ. 15, 18 (1989) (noting that predominantly
functional works have received limited copyright protection due to lack of expressive elements).
For more discussion of the idea-expression distinction and its underlying public domain
policies, see, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Elgibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled
Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 601-05 (1985) (speculating that idea-expression distinction may
allow process-oriented computerprogram to receive copyright protection that other non-process-
oriented programs may not receive);Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY LJ. 965, 995-
99 (1990) (explaining difficulty in distinguishing ideas from expression in order to show why
copyright is acceptable in certain situations but not in others); Melville B. Nimmer, A Comment
on the Douglas Dissent in Lee v. Runge, 19 BULL COPYMRGHT SOCy 68, 68-69 (1971) (maintaining
that only protectible aspect of work may lie in literal expression).
188. As the court in Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Telegraph Co. stated:
It would be an atrocious doctrine to hold that dispatches, the result of the diligence
and expenditure of one man, could with impunity be pilfered and published by
another.
The mere fact that a certain class of information is open to all that seek it, is no
answer to a claim to a right of property in such information made by a person who,
at his own expense and by his own labor, has collected it.
Kieruan v. Manhattan Quotation Tel. Co., 50 How. Pr. 194, 196-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876); accord
Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F. Cas. 759, 760 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 961) ("[A compiler] cannot use
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competing works that exhibited only a modicum of independent
effort.189 Professor Ginsburg accurately characterized early copy-
right guarantees in low authorship works as recognizing a right to bar
reproduction, not establishing a right to monopolize information and
preclude the creation of derivative works."l Modem copyright law
should seek this balance.
The Supreme Court drew a distinction between the "use" and
"explanation" of utilitarian works in Baker v. Selden,191 recognizing
the need to protect authors' investments while avoiding monopolies
over information.192 In Baker, the Court recognized that protecting
the author's original explanation from unauthorized copying, while
allowing second-comers (i.e. consumers or subsequent authors) to still
use the information within that publication, extended an appropriate
level of protection over utilitarian works. The Court stated:
The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts
is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it
contains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge
the labors of a previous compiler ... and save his own time by copying the results of the
previous compiler's study, although the same results could have been attained by independent
labor.").
189. See Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (KLB. 1802) ("[W]hen, in the defendant's
book there are additional observations ... while I shall think myself bound to secure every man
in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science."); see also Cary v.
Lougman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.(b) (KLB. 1785) (finding no copyright violation in
navigational charts when defendant made improvements upon plaintiff's original work); DRONE,
supra note 178, at 386 ("[A] fundamental principle of the law of copyright [is] ... that a work,
to be free from piracy, must be the result of the author's 'own labor, skill, and use of common
materials and common sources of knowledge open to all men.'" (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8
F. Cas. 615, 624 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436))).
According to these authorities, exercising "new toil and talent" over another's work gives rise
to "new property and rights in the last compiler." Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas. 511,517 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323). Copyright protection of utilitarian works, including those containing
information that society preferred to leave in the public domain, neither placed the entire
burden of producing updated versions on the first author nor hindered others from making
improvements upon preexisting works. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1878 (describing
deleterious effects of extensive rights in labor-intensive works).
The same policies favoring the advancement of knowledge and the rewarding of labor
that endowed informational works with copyright exculpated a second comer's reliance
on the copyrighted work when he added considerable personal effort to what he
copied. Copyright would protect the first author against thieves, but not against those
whose investment of their borrowings from the initial source produced a higher net
yield.
Id. at 1877.
190. SeeGinsburg, supra note 56, at 1890 ("When the work manifested an authorial presence,
its scope of protection extended beyond reproduction to encompass at least some derivative
works exploitations. But, if the derivative works right flows from the personality concept, the
rationale for the right would not seem to apply to low authorship works."). A derivative work
is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
191. 101 U.S. 99 (1880)
192. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880). The work at issue in Baker was a book
explaining a new system of book-keeping. See i&.
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could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.
And where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the
methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book.., such methods
and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art,
and given therewith to the public ....
[w]hilst no one has a right to print or publish [another
author's] book or any material part thereof, ... any person may
practice and use the art [explained and illustrated within the
book]. The use of the art is a totally different thing from a
publication of the book explaining it.195
The Court reasoned in Bakerthat where an idea and its expression are
inextricably linked, courts must limit the exclusive rights guaranteed
by copyright-" The Court therefore denied Selden any exclusive
right over the forms and methods necessary to employ his book-
keeping system,195 protecting only his exclusive right to "print or
publish" the instructive work.'96
In the same fashion, copyright law could respond to the needs of
modem information commerce and secure an author's investment in
the original and independent collection of information by prohibiting
only the copying of substantial portions of the work's useful aspects
for direct reproduction in a competing work. The law could permit
other reproductions of these aspects, such as those by consumers in
the course of their use of the information, or those by subsequent
193. I& at 103-04.
194. This doctrine is called the "merger doctrine." See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v.
Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990). It dictates that when an idea and its
expression cannot be bifurcated (or the idea can only be expressed in a "mere handful" of
ways), the two merge and the law will deny both protection in order to avoid granting a
monopoly over the idea. See id.; Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st
Cir. 1967).
195. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 107.
The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays
no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself.... [Tihe mere copyright of
Selden's book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use [the]
account-books... as described... and illustrated in said book.
Id. at 105-07.
196. See id. at 103. Baker is perhaps best known for the proposition that even an author's
right to control reproduction of parts of a utilitarian work can be limited. As one author
explains:
[Tihe historical role of Bakery. Seldenwas to override the exclusive reproduction rights
as applied to utilitarian works in a very particular set of circumstances. These were
cases in which the standard defenses (including idea-expression) appeared insufficient
to guarantee a third party's right to use functional features embodied in the work
because that use seemed to entail an unauthorized reproduction of the protected work
Jerome H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copight
Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 693 n.288 (1989).
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compilers engaged in recompiling the information within an
originally arranged or collected compilation. Such limited protection
would require copyright to recognize "original authorship" as
encompassing the industriousness of an author.
As stated earlier," modern copyright analysis has discarded the
"laborious authorship" justification of copyright protection in
exchange for a unitary, personality-based concept of original
authorship. 9 ' Nevertheless, the fundamental unfairness early courts
identified in allowing a second-comer to appropriate another's labor
as his own has persisted.' Modern courts still often protect low
authorship works by either scrambling to find indicia of high
authorship within low authorship works,2" or by turning to alterna-
197. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204,205 (2d Cir.
1986) (denying protection to index cards based on lack of sufficient subjective authorship);
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 809 (11th
Cir. 1985) (recognizing that industriousness is no longer relevant criterion for copyright under
Copyright Act of 1976); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir.
1981) (conditioning copyright protection for directories on novel selection and arrangement
facts rather than industrious compilation of information); see also WI.LAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S
THE CoPRIGHT LAW 63-64 (6th ed. 1986) (applying same standard of originality to compilations
as to other literary works and rejecting recognition of copyright based on labor expended by
author); L. Ray Patterson & CraigJoyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for
Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719, 759-64 (1989). But see Beryl K.
Jones, Copyright: Factual Compilations and the Second Circuit 52 BROOxLYN L. REv. 679, 700-03
(1986); cf. Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REv. 29, 45 (1983).
199. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text (describing reluctance of 19th century
courts to exonerate those who produced competing works merely by copying original works
without additional contribution); see also, e.g., Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (D.D.C.
1985) (stating that expression of newsworthy items is protected from wholesale copying under
Copyright Act); Trow Directory, Printing & Bookbinding Co. v. Boyd, 97 F. 586, 587
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899) (granting preliminary injunction where plaintiff made strong showing of
copyright infringement and defendant failed to demonstrate own original work); Bluntv. Patten,
3 F. Cas. 763, 764-65 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (no. 1580) (observing that party infringes copyright
by directly copying the work of another, thus taking first author's "labor and skill"); see also
Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1985)
(emphasizing that copyright covers only incremental contribution and not underlying informa-
tion); National Bus. Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 92 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(noting that courts historically have granted protection against "appropriation of the fruits of
the compiler's industry"); Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1905 ("Courts nevertheless have stretched
copyright protection to prohibit remanipulation of information when the information has been
stripped of any trappings of authorial presence." In essence, courts that condemn this kind of
copying seek to secure the first compiler's investment and reprimand free riders).
200. See, e.g., West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1226-27 (8th Cir.
1986) (finding that arrangements of legal decisions were entitled to copyright protection);
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801,809-10 & n.9
(11th Cir. 1985) (ruling that telephone directory satisfied originality requirement); Hutchinson
Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985) (declaring that
alphabetical telephone directory was original work of authorship); cf Robert C. Denicoa,
Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theoryfor the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works 81 COLUM. L.
Rv. 516, 530 (1981) (characterizing particular collection of data as original authorship).
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tive justifications like unfair competition, 01 misappropriation, 02
or breach of contract.3 Thus, the judiciary continues to recognize
that even in the absence of high authorship, there is something wrong
with reaping where one did not sow
°204
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL FACILTATION OF
INFORMATION COMMERCE
A. Distinguish Licenses from Sales by Codification
Contract law would best protect information commerce if it
abandoned its traditional analysis of information agreements2 5 and
distinguished the licensing of intangibles from the sale of goods.0
The peculiarities of intangibles licensing deserve a commercial code
separate from U.C.C. Article 2.207 The Drafting Committee's
proposal to reform Article 2 represents a significant step toward
developing a discrete set of uniform principles that accurately
characterize the contemporary commercial practices of information
commerce.
2 08
201. See, e.g., Rockford Map Publishers, Inc., 768 F.2d at 149-50 (deciding that second compiler,
who copied first compiler's plot map engaged in unfair competition because work was not
"independent production"); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1977)
(declaring that wholesale copying of directory without independent verification constituted
unfair competition).
202. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245 (1918)
(concluding that selling of news tips by competitor constituted misappropriation). For a general
discussion of the misappropriation doctrine, see Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual
F'operty and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 411,
412-15 (1983).
203. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996) (condemning
defendant's unauthorized copying of commercially valuable database for purpose of reselling
it over Internet by enforcement of licensing agreement).
204. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1904 (explaining that judiciary still views copyright as
means to reward investment while penalizing those who take shortcuts).
205. "[T]he dominant method of thinking about political, social, and legal issues continues
to focus on criteria and issues relevant to trade in, and manufacture of, goods." Nimmer &
Krauthaus, supra note 7, at 104 n.2 (describing continued "goods bias" in American economy
despite increasing predominance of commerce in services and information products); see
SAuVANT, supra note 142, at 2 ("Like generals who blindly prepare for the last war, our economic
policymakers spend too much ... time thinking about the last economy.").
206. See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1379-81 (distinguishing licenses from tangible goods by
describing various ways in which value of license can be transferred).
207. See id. at 1350 ("Software and related intangibles licensing constitute a major
commercial enterprise whose contracts should be brought within relevant, tailored commercial
law. Codification, both as a process and in the product it yields, offers advantages that cannot
be replicated through 'common law' development of contract principles.").
208. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing "hub and spoke" framework
of U.C.C. revisions, which would place common contract principles in hub chapter while
addressing special characteristics of leasing and licensing in spoke chapters).
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B. Expand the Scope of Capyright Protection to Include Low Authorship
Works of Commercial Value2°9
The rising prominence of information commerce in today's
economy, in connection with the development of the NII and other
electronic media, calls for the law to once again acknowledge a binary
system of copyright."' Protecting the commercial value of informa-
tion works gathered at the expense and investment of the compiler
is faithful to copyright's early interpretations of original authorship
and an effective means of securing a just award.2 ' Extending the
privileges of copyright protection to low authorship information
compilations would reward authors for the usefulness of their works
rather than the presence of subjective expression.
212
The Copyright Act of 1976 would require amendment to restore the
investment or "sweat" concept of original authorship that Feist
rejected. 3 Specifically, the definition of compilation in Section 101
of the Act might be revised to read in one of the two following ways:
Option 1: A "compilation" is a work composed of pre-existing
material or data. A "compilation" constitutes an original work of
authorship by virtue of the compiler's own original collection,
coordination, selection or arrangement of that preexisting material
or data.
Option 2: A "compilation" is a collection of pre-existing material or
data that constitutes an original work of authorship when its
content is collected, coordinated, selected or arranged by the
compiler's original, independent efforts.
So modified, federal copyright law would establish information
compilations as original works of authorship by virtue of their unique
209. Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), Professor Ginsburg recognized the inappropriateness of
adopting a unitary, personality-based approach to copyright in the context of printed factual
compilations:
The error of our modem doctrine lies in its implicit... claim that a personality-based
approach to copyright law has completely displaced the sweat/investment model.
Recognition of our dual bases for copyright not only would be more faithful to our
copyright history, but also would squarely confront the interests at issue in a rapidly
growing sector of publishing activity.
Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1870.
210. See supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text (describing early form of copyright
protection based on author's original industriousness and investment of labor).
211. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984) (noting
that copyright balances society's interest in free flow of ideas and commerce with "the interests
of authors ... in the control and exploitation of their writings").
212. See supra notes 186-204 and accompanying text (proposing limited copyright protection
for works of information based on their usefulness, rather than mere creativity).
213. See Feist 499 U.S. at 364 (holding that copying names, towns, and telephone numbers
did not infringe copyright because listings resulted from effort and not originality).
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arrangement or because of the compiler's independent collection of
commercially valuable information.
C. Narrowly Define the Rights of Cpyright in Low Authorship Works
While copyright protection secures an author's investment in his
work, it should not further endow him with a monopoly over the raw
ideas and facts included in that work. The following proposed
amendment to section 103 of the Copyright Act suggests that
protection of low authorship works should include only those rights
that are necessary to secure a fair return:
Proposed § 103(b): The copyright in a derivative work extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distin-
guished from the pre-existing material employed in the work, and
does not imply an exclusive right in the pre-existing material. The
copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any
copyright protection in the pre-existing material.
Proposed § 103(c): The copyright in a compilation extends: (i) to
the material contributed by the author of such work, as distin-
guished from the pre-existing material employed in the work, and
(ii) to any data independently collected by the author, subject to
the restrictions of this section.
(1) The copyright in material contributed by the author and
independently collected data is independent of, and does not
affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence
of, any copyright protection in the pre-existing material em-
ployed in the work.
(2) The copyright in independently collected data shall endow
an exclusive right only insofar as its direct reproduction into a
competing work is concerned. The copyright in the collected
data shall neither extend to intermediate reproductions necessary
to the creation of subsequent compilations or derivative works
nor proscribe reproductions that may be considered fair use
under § 107 or archival under § 117. The copyright in such data
does not imply any other exclusive rights in that data.
This proposed amendment institutes a copyright regime in low
authorship informational works that adheres to the historical function
of copyright. First, it protects the low authorship aspects of indepen-
dently collected information compilations from reproduction only
insofar as direct copying for competitive resale or distribution is
concerned. This right would not proscribe copying that fell within
1672
THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION COMMERCE
the category of "fair use"" 4 or interfere with the right to make back-
up copies.1 5 Second, denying the original compiler any other
exclusive right in the information, including the right to make
derivative works, ensures that second-comers may reshuffle, add to, or
update the work's contents in the creation of a new compilation, and
ensures that consumers may also use the information without
infringing a copyright. This framework would give information
suppliers the exclusive right to disseminate their commodity while it
is commercially valuable and simultaneously would allow the general
public to use and recompile its contents.1 6
CONCLUSION
As the United States moves closer to realizing a National Informa-
tion Infrastructure it is appropriate for law makers to reevaluate the
rules governing the exchange of information. Making a legal
distinction between the licensing of intangibles and the sale of goods
will become more important as technology continues to facilitate the
exchange of information. First, the law of contract should treat
licenses of intangible goods in a separate codification, establishing
rules that better reflect and support the commercial practices of
parties. Second, as to copyright law, an alternative justification for
protecting works of information, one currently ignored by contempo-
rary interpretations of copyright's scope, must be recognized.
Adopting a second justification for copyright protection that includes
low authorship elements of a work independently and originally
collected would protect the investment of information suppliers,
would provide greater incentive to create and disseminate information
to society at large, and would ensure that the general public may fully
employ the information contained within.
214. "Fair use" is a limitation to the exclusive rights of copyright that allows reproduction
of otherwise copyrightable work for the purposes of "criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research .... " See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
215. See id. § 117 (permitting owner of computer program to modify and make back-up
copies of program, but prohibiting owner to further reproduce, sell, or transfer copies without
also transferring original program).
216. Before Feist, Professor Ginsburg proposed to grant low authorship works a similar set
of rights. One of her recommendations included extending copyright protection to the
independently collected elements of information compilations, but limiting that copyright by
compelling the owner to license the work for certain purposes like the creation of derivative
works. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 1924-36.
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